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BIANNUAL SURVEY

closure such information may be obtained by a bill of particulars,
or other article 31 procedure. After the information, is obtained
a notice under CPLR 3120 would be proper. However, since a
motion is no longer required, and the only prerequisite is particularity, where the party can sufficiently identify the object, an
examination before trial would not appear to be a condition
precedent to discovery under 3120.209 In the final analysis the
determination as to whether the notice is sufficiently particular
must lie within the discretion of the court.
CPLR 3120(1): Discovery limited to parties.
The question in Avila Fabrics, Inc. v. 152 West 36th St.
Corp.2 10 was whether CPLR 3120(1) permits discovery of a
document in the exclusive possession of one not a party to the
litigation. Under the CPA, discovery and inspection were limited
to parties. 21 ' The majority commented that the Revisers based
CPLR 3120 on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 which is
specifically limited to parties. The court then held that since
the legislative history of CPLR 3120 shows no intention of
changing the doctrine of the CPA, discovery may not be had against
non-parties. In an excellent dissenting opinion, Justice Eager
pointed out that in view of the liberal policy enunciated in CPLR
3101(a) the discovery provisions in CPLR 3120 should not be
limited to parties.
CPLR 3101(a) provides: "There shall be full disclosure of
all evidence. . . ." Consequently the four subdivisions of CPLR
3101(a) are not restricted to parties. In addition, the disclosure
devices enumerated in CPLR 3102(a) include not only depositions,
but also "discovery and inspection of documents." 2 12 It would,
therefore, appear that discovery, as one form of disclosure under
3101(a) and 3102(a), is not limited to a party to the action.
On the other hand, CPLR 3120 pertaining to discovery provides:
"After commencement of an action, any party may serve on any
other party notice. . . ." Thus an obvious ambiguity exists.
CPLR 3120 in relation to discovery refers to a party to the
action, while CPLR 3101(a) and 3102(a) lead to the conclusion
that discovery, a disclosure device, is not restricted to parties.
209 This position is strengthened by the FrsT REP. 121:

"Parties are not limited in their choice to one or more disclosure devices.
Nor is there any express limit on the number of times a device may be

used.

However, abuse either willful or due to incompetence, may be

checked by [CPLR 3103] . . . !"
21022 App. Div. 2d 238, 254 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1st Dep't 1964).
211 CPA §§ 324, 327, 328; Lipsey v. 940 St. Nicholas Ave. Corp., 12 App.
Div. 2d 414, 212 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1st Dep't 1961); Goldstein v. Kaye, 2 App.
Div. 2d 889, 156 N.Y.S2d 238 (2nd Dep't 1956).
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In Williams v. Sterling Estates, Inc., 1 3 the court suggested
that the ambiguity could be reconciled by restricting discovery
on mere notice to parties, and requiring a motion as against nonparties, with the caveat that in the latter instance there must be
a showing of a special circumstance within the meaning of CPLR
3101 (a) (4). This resolution seems to be in accord with the
"primary purpose of Article 31 [which] is to require maximum
disclosure of facts with minimum resort to the courts." 214
It should be noted that although the majority opinion in
Avila could have been more liberal, it did not leave the defendant
without remedy. The court suggested that the defendant might
require the production of the records at an examination before trial
pursuant to CPLR 3111. Therefore by using CPLR 3111 and
an examination before trial the defendant could accomplish that
which he could not do under CPLR 3120(1). Since the effect
of CPLR 3120(1) can be achieved against non-parties through
CPLR 3111; since the philosophy of the CPLR is liberality;
and since an adequate protective order can be employed (under
CPLR 3103) to prevent abuse, it is submitted that CPLR 3120(1)
should not be interpreted so as to restrict discovery to parties.

Notwithstanding local court rules to the contrary, disclosure may
be had in malpractice cases.
Where the mental or physical condition of a party is in
issue CPLR 3120 and 3121 provide for discovery, inspection
and a medical examination on notice. There are no specified
exceptions to this rule. On the other hand, Rule XI of the
New York and Bronx County Supreme Court provides for such
discovery, except in malpractice cases. The issue presented in
Kromanik v. Twdss, 215 a malpractice case, was whether the CPLR
takes precedence over the local court rules. The court held that
it does.
CPLR 101 provides that the CPLR "shall govern the procedure in civil judicial proceedings in all courts of the state . . .
except where the procedure is regulated by inconsistent statute."
By the plain meaning of this language the local court rules (which
are not statutory enactments) are subservient to the provisions of
CPLR 3120 and 3121, and malpractice cages are not without the
ambit of discovery proceedings.
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41 Misc. 2d 692, 245 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct. 1963).

7B McKiNNEYS CPLR art 31, practice commentary 4; see also
CPLR 104.
215 44 Misc. 2d 627, 254 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct 1964).

